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This paper reports an experiment designed to evaluate interrelationships between strategic 
buyers, market power and merger-induced synergies.  The experiment consists of 40 posted-offer 
quadropolies.  Treatments include the use of simulated or human buyers, seller consolidations 
and merger-induced fixed cost and unit cost synergies.  In the simulated-buyer markets we 
observe behavior generally consistent with comparative static predictions: prices rise post-
merger, and unit (but not fixed) cost synergies may exert some price-moderating effect.  The 
addition of powerful buyers changes results markedly.  Although prices are lower in the human 
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Most standard treatments of oligopoly behavior assume that buyers are passive, full demand-
revealing agents.  Although this assumption conforms well to a number of industrial contexts, in 
other situations buyers are often quite concentrated.  Indeed, as Inderst and Wey (2003) observe, 
following the emergence of large retail chains, buyer concentration has become a critical feature 
of the relationship between manufacturers and retailers.  Commentators have long suggested that 
strategic buyer behavior might affect market outcomes.  The idea of countervailing power dates 
at least to Galbriath (1952), who argued that powerful buyers might offset the effects of seller 
market power.
1  
Countervailing power is particularly important for horizontal merger policy.  In the last 
decade,  unilateral effects analysis has become an important focus of horizontal-merger 
enforcement in the United States.
2  Central to unilateral effects analysis is the notion that 
merger-related market power concerns emanate from changes in the strategic situation facing 
sellers.  However, the pertinent models (e.g., Deneckere and Davidson 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 
1990, and Werden and Froeb, 1994) uniformly assume that buyers are passive.  Powerful 
strategic buyers may affect importantly the predictions of such models.  Not only may strategic 
buyers undermine seller market power both pre-merger and post-merger, they may also extract 
some or all of any merger-related synergies.  
In antitrust investigations, consolidating parties often argue that large buyers will expropriate 
merger-induced cost efficiencies, and then pass these savings along to consumers in the form of 
lower prices.  Consolidating parties make these claims even if the efficiencies involve only 
unavoidable fixed costs.
3  For example, in FTC v. Cardinal Health and FTC v. McKesson Corp., 
the third and first largest pharmaceutical wholesalers proposed to purchase, respectively, the 
second and the fourth largest wholesalers.  The plaintiffs argued that the consolidations would 
generate hundreds of millions of dollars of merger-specific fixed-cost savings, the vast bulk of 
                                                 
1 Empirical studies documenting the effects of countervailing power include Lustgarten (1975), Chipty (1995), and, 
Chipty and Snyder (1999).  
2 In the 1992 revision of their Horizontal Merger Guidelines the United States Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission added to the traditional cooperative effects enforcement focus a unilateral effects focus. 
3 That fixed cost savings often loom large as a component of consolidating parties’ case for cognizable efficiencies 
is unsurprising.  Although some consolidations may allow rationalization of production lines, or other changes that 
reduce unit production or distribution costs, overhead savings attributable to the elimination of duplicative central 
administrative offices represents an almost generic merger-induced efficiency.  Further, given the often immense 
costs of reorganizing the administrative structure of a consolidating firm, administrative fixed costs are most 
plausibly viewed as unavoidable in any reasonable operating horizon. which would be passed along to consumers.  An important part of the respondent’s case was that 
the relevant market included very large buyers, and that the price reductions would be extracted 
by powerful buyers who would not settle for less.  
The effects of countervailing buyer power are not well understood either theoretically or 
empirically.  Understandably, the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines articulate no standard for 
identifying circumstances where buyers may be expected counteract the anti-competitive effects 
of mergers.  Courts in the United States, however, have not been entirely unsympathetic to 
arguments that countervailing power can offset the effects of increased seller concentration.  For 
example, in United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., the court refused to enjoin a merger 
where three large customers accounted for 90% of all fluid milk sales in the relevant market.
4  
Some research also suggests that other countries are more receptive to the notion that 
countervailing power can balance increasing seller concentration.  Dobson and Waterman (1997) 
contend that increased concentration in the British retail industry relative to that in the United 
States reflects a more sanguine view in Great Britain about the ameliorative effects of 
countervailing buyer power. 
This paper reports an experiment conducted to shed some light on the interrelationships 
between powerful buyers, market power, and merger-induced efficiencies.  Laboratory methods 
present a useful way to generate insights into the effects of strategic buyers, for two reasons.  
First, for markets with strategic buyers, no counterpart to the standard Bertrand and Cournot 
models exists that is both analytically tractable, and describes the effects of withholding 
reasonably well.  Adding strategic buyers complicates the analysis, because the potential for 
withholding obfuscates critical features of the underlying game, such as the price formation 
mechanism (bargaining, posted prices, etc.), the game’s extensive form, and the appropriate 
information structure.  Analyzing the possibility of strategic buyer withholding also requires the 
contemplation of repeated interactions, since foregoing purchases in one time period can only be 
rational if such behavior elicits more desirable prices in future periods.  Experiments are a useful 
way to initiate theoretical research on these issues, as they have the potential to provide guidance 
to theorists about how such markets work.  
                                                 
4 Other factors important in the decision to not enjoin the merger include low entry barriers and a complete absence 
of brand differentiation. 
  2Second, inherent data problems impede the evaluation of interrelationships between 
mergers, synergies and strategic buyers with naturally-occurring data.  In natural contexts both 
costs and merger-associated cost synergies are observable only indirectly.  A number of factors 
other than cost changes or changes in the strategic context induced by the merger may drive post-
merger prices.  The relevant dataset may also suffer from selection bias, as antitrust authorities 
often challenge the very cases that are of primary interest.  In the laboratory, costs and the 
magnitude and type of cost savings can be controlled.  All consolidations are legal and both 
market power and countervailing buyer behavior can be observed directly. 
As a preview, we find that in markets with passive (simulated) buyers standard 
theoretical predictions organize outcomes reasonably well.  In these markets, prices tend to 
increase following consolidations, and synergies exert the predicted effects: fixed cost savings 
clearly do nothing to affect merger-induced market power changes, and, while the data are not 
unambiguous, some evidence suggests that unit cost synergies may exert a price-tempering 
effect.  However, the addition of large human buyers changes market outcomes dramatically.  
Median prices in the large-buyer markets fall below median prices in the simulated-buyer 
markets both pre-merger and post-merger, and prices tend not to increase post-merger.  Mean 
trading efficiency in the real buyer markets also falls, as buyers persistently forego profitable 
purchases in an effort to drive prices down.  Finally, while considerable variability characterizes 
outcomes in the real-buyer markets, buyers do, in several instances extract the bulk of both fixed 
and unit cost synergies created by a consolidation. 
We organize the presentation as follows.  Section 2 below reviews the related literature.  
Section 3 sketches out a simple model that motivates our experimental design, and serves as the 
foundation for our conjectures regarding experimental results.  Section 4 describes the 
experimental design and procedures, and section 5 presents our experimental results.  We 
conclude with a brief sixth section.  
 
2. The Related Literature. 
A growing theoretical literature addresses the effects of buyer power on pricing 
outcomes.  Most of these papers evaluate the effects of buyer size in a static bilateral bargaining 
context, either under Nash bargaining (e.g., Chipty and Snyder, 1999, Horn and Wolinsky, 1988, 
or using specific bargaining procedures that gives rise to a Shapley value (e.g,. Inderst and Wey, 
  32003, Stole and Zwiebel, 1996a,b).
5  More nearly pertinent to the current study is Groh (2004) 
who analyzes bilateral bargaining in a repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth game, where sellers post 
prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis for single units to randomly-matched buyers.  Among other 
results, Groh identifies an “optimal equilibrium” for buyers in which credible withholding threats 
result in the buyer extracting all of the available surplus.  Groh also shows that giving a buyer an 
“outside option” of shopping elsewhere can reduce the buyer’s optimal equilibrium payoff, a 
result which suggests that withholding opportunities may benefit buyers only little.
6  While 
Groh’s analysis is provocative, the bilateral nature of negotiations in his game make it only 
indirectly relevant to the multilateral market contexts that underlie antitrust policy.
7  To our 
knowledge no theoretical work considers countervailing buyer power in a multilateral market 
context with posted prices. 
Withholding behavior has been has been the subject of extensive attention by 
experimentalists, most prominently in the ultimatum game.  The persistent behavioral tendency 
for ‘proposers’ (sellers) and ‘responders’ (buyers) to split the surplus far more equally than 
predicted in the static Nash equilibrium has been a source of considerable debate (see, for 
example the discussion in Roth, 1995).
8  Groh’s baseline bargaining environment is a repeated 
version of the ultimatum game.  Regardless of the factors motivating surplus divisions in the 
static game, Groh’s analysis suggests that repetition (at least indefinite repetition) should move 
the division of the surplus in the favor of buyers, as repetition creates for responders the 
possibility of credible threats to forego divisions offered on insufficiently attractive terms.   
Slembeck (1999) reports an experiment that provides some insight into the effects of repetition 
                                                 
5 A general result in this literature is that the capacity of large buyers to elicit discounts turns on the curvature of the 
surplus function.  In particular, large buyers elicit lower prices in an equilibrium if the surplus function is convex (as 
would be typically the case, for example, when sellers face increasing marginal costs).  Recently Normann, Ruffle 
and Snyder (2003) develop a similar result in a static game in a posted-bid context.  These authors also report an 
experiment that supports this prediction. 
6  This latter result is driven by the assumptions (a) that buyers see only a single price quote each period, and (b) that 
sellers do not know the buyers’ history of accepting or rejecting contracts.  Reducing switching costs encourages 
buyers to “defect” from a strategy of buying only at very low prices by making a purchase and then going to a pool 
of unmatched sellers in the next period.  A seller treats any new match as a new customer, and posts a high initial 
price.  Thus, the possibility of switching effectively reduces the strength of seller punishments and thus raises the 
optimal equilibrium price.  
7 Repeated contacts between specific buyers and sellers are a defining feature of the “customer markets” analyzed by 
Groh.  In the standard oligopoly models that underlie antitrust policy sellers post prices publicly to all buyers.  Thus, 
sellers compete directly with each other, as well as with buyers.  
8 Many commentators (e.g,. Guth et al., 1982) attribute the tendency for buyers and sellers to split the available 
surplus to some concern for “fairness”, while others (e.g., Hoffman, et al., 1994) argue that context, and perceived 
entitlements to property rights drive observed outcomes. 
  4of the ultimatum game.  Comparing the results of a “fixed pairs” treatment, where participants 
were re-matched in a series of 20 consecutive rounds with a parallel 20-round “rotation pairing” 
treatment, Slembeck finds that proposed offers fall only marginally (by just 1 percentage point).  
However, responders’ rejection rates increased by about 10 percentage points in the repeated 
treatment relative to the baseline treatment.
9  Slembeck also finds that personal characteristics of 
the players are much more likely to influence the dynamics of play in the fixed pairs treatment.  
Persistently rematched “tough” proposers and “tough” responders, for example, are more likely 
to suffer disagreements than “fair” players. 
Slembeck’s observations regarding repetition in ultimatum games appear to extend to 
more complicated multi-agent repeated posted-offer markets.  Ruffle (2000) and Engle-Warnick 
and Ruffle (2003) find that fully informed posted-offer buyers often engage in very considerable 
withholding.  As a consequence, surplus extraction rates (“trading efficiencies”) were in some 
markets considerably below levels normally observed in posted-offer markets, and prices in 
some markets fell below the range of competitive equilibrium predictions.  Further, outcomes 
were characterized by very considerable variability across markets, suggesting that the personal 
characteristics of both buyers and sellers may importantly affect outcomes in repeated full-
information markets.
10  
Theoretical and experimental analyses of unilateral market power represent a second 
strand of pertinent literature.  As is well known, in a Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game (with 
passive buyers) seller capacity constraints can raise the static Nash equilibrium price from one 
determined by the intersection of market supply and demand curves, to a mixing distribution of 
prices that strictly exceed the competitive outcome (see, e.g., Kreps and Schienkman, 1983, 
                                                 
9  All participants knew that the game would last exactly 20 periods.  Thus, the standard analysis would suggest that 
strategic withholding is not part of an equilibrium strategy for a responder.  If each subgame of a finitely repeated 
game has the same unique equilibrium, that strategy defines the unique subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for the 
finitely repeated game.  
10  Common knowledge about costs and values is a critical element in the design of the Ruffle (2000) and Engle-
Warnick and Ruffle (2003) experiments.  Absent information about underlying costs and values, Davis and Williams 
(1990) find that buyers appear incapable of recognizing their capacity to manipulate the terms of trade.  In a “Buyer 
Market Power” design, where the withholding of a single unit by either of two buyers shifts downward substantially 
the equilibrium price Davis and Williams find that buyers never recognize their price-manipulating capacity.  To the 
contrary, buyers almost uniformly purchased all units available, even those units that were only marginally 
profitable.  Each of four markets conducted converged to competitive predictions, and buyers consummated all but 
10 of 521 possible contracts 
  5Osborne and Pitchik, 1986 and Davidson and Deneckere, 1986).
11  The reasoning driving results 
in models of this type underlies standard unilateral effects analysis; horizontal consolidations 
change the residual demand conditions for the remaining firms, thus altering the support of the 
relevant mixing distributions.
12  Related experimental research by Davis and Holt (1994) 
indicates that sellers recognize and exercise such unilateral market power when a horizontal 
merger creates the necessary imbalances between residual demand and supply.
13  
A third strand of pertinent literature evaluates the effect of cost savings on market 
performance.  As a theoretical matter, unit  cost reductions can generate lower prices, and 
expanded seller profits.
14  Thus, unit-cost synergies can attenuate merger-induced market power 
increases.  Werden and Froeb (1994) develop a policy model that considers explicitly the 
tradeoffs between merger induced market power increases and cost synergies in a differentiated 
product Bertrand setting.
15  Results of laboratory experiments by Davis and Wilson (2000, 2006) 
suggest that unit-cost synergies can exert a price-damping effect.
16  In contrast to unit costs, 
unavoidable fixed costs do not affect pricing decisions, and thus should not affect pricing, even 
though fixed cost savings may increase seller profits.  Again, using laboratory evidence in a 
                                                 
11 Cripps and Ireland (1988) analyze such a game in a “box” structure that more closely resembles our experimental 
setup. 
12 Holt (1989) draws explicitly the link between market power as defined in the Guidelines, and seller incentives to 
raise prices induced by capacity constraints. 
13 Here we focus on price-setting (Bertrand) environments. Due to the relative subtlety of a quantity-setting context, 
Cournot markets tend to be considerably more volatile than Bertrand markets (e.g., Davis, Reilly and Wilson, 2003) 
and sellers find market power more difficult to recognize.  Also in Cournot markets, merging parties typically earn 
less than they earned as independent sellers (see e.g., Farrell and Shapiro, 1990), a factor that complicates the 
laboratory analysis of mergers in Cournot markets.  In experimental studies, Wellford (1990) and Davis (2002) find 
little evidence that sellers recognize the change in power induced by a horizontal consolidation.  On the other hand, 
Huck et al. (2001) report some evidence that sellers eventually reduce aggregate quantities post-merger, even though 
the merging parties do not reduce output as much as predicted.  
14 Unit cost synergies reduce equilibrium prices when firms face no capacity constraints, and in specialized cases of 
capacity constraints, such as the single step demand function used here.  More generally, however, unit cost 
synergies may not reduce equilibrium prices for capacity-constrained sellers in a Bertrand-Edgeworth price setting 
game.  As Deneckere and Kovenok (1996) demonstrate, given constant unit costs, a concave revenue function and 
efficient rationing, a small synergy to only one of the firms will leave unchanged the mixing distribution for the 
seller enjoying the cost reduction, and will raise the mean of the mixing distribution for the other firm.  
15 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) also evaluate the price mitigating effects of unit cost savings on mergers, but in a 
Cournot rather than in a Bertrand context.  
16 Similarly, in a Cournot environment Wellford (1990) finds some consistent evidence that sellers increase 
quantities (and lower prices) in response to economies of scale, despite failing to exercise merger-induced market 
power. 
  6passive buyer context, Davis and Wilson (2000) find that a fixed cost synergy leaves pricing 
unaffected.
17   
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of strategic buyers on merger-induced seller 
market power increases, as well as on the price-ameliorating effects of merger-induced synergies 
has not been explored, either theoretically or empirically in the laboratory.   
 
3. Mergers, Synergies and Strategic Buyers: Reference Predictions and Some Conjectures. 
This section develops a simple market structure to generate reference predictions given 
passive buyers, and then offers some informal conjectures regarding behavior given strategic 
buyers.  The section consists of three parts.  Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 generate static predictions in 
a standard Bertrand-Edgeworth context regarding the effects of mergers, and synergies, 
respectively.  Then subsection 3.3 lays out the cost and information conditions in the repeated 
game with large, powerful buyers, and offers some informal conjectures regarding the 
consequences strategic buyer behavior on market power and synergies.  
 
3.1. Mergers and Synergies with Passive Buyers. Consider a market with four symmetrical 
sellers, S1, S2, S3, and S4,  each of whom may sell up to two units each period, in integer 
quantities.  Sellers produce under conditions of a constant unit cost c, and an unavoidable fixed 
cost  F.
18  The demand side of the market consists of seven  units, each of which will be 
purchased at prices up to and including a reservation value v.  The stage-game is a standard 
Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game, with simultaneous seller pricing decisions, followed by 
purchases from a fully revealing buyer, who buys the lowest priced units first, and in the case of 
a tie rotates purchases among the sellers posting the same price.  
The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates this market for the case where c = $2, v = $6 and F = 
$3.  (To facilitate the presentation of our experimental design, we will use these parameter values 
to generate numerical predictions throughout this section.)  Notice from the intersection of 
supply and demand arrays that in a competitive outcome, sellers post a competitive price pc = c 
                                                 
17 Buchheit and Feltovich (2005) report an experiment suggesting that changes in sunk costs do exert some effect on 
pricing decisions, although the relation between sunk cost levels and prices these authors report is, rather curiously, 
non-monotonic. 
18 Thus, fixed costs here are essentially sunk.  We defer to future analysis the interesting case of avoidable fixed 
costs (where fixed costs are incurred only if the firm produces a positive quantity).  Assuming unavoidable fixed 
costs both simplifies the analysis, and is more realistic in markets where sellers find impractical the contemplation 
of dismissing and rehiring overhead staff across pricing decisions.  
  7and lose their fixed cost outlay F each period.  To earn zero profits (in expectation), sellers must 
receive breakeven price pbe = $3.71 each period.
19
Notice, however that, pc = c is not a Nash equilibrium for the stage game.  Given the 
aggregate excess supply of one unit, any seller can be certain to sell at least one unit at 
reservation price v, and earn (v – c) – F.   Neither is p = v a Nash equilibrium, since only seven 
of the eight available units sell each period.  Following the extensive theoretical literature on 
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition (e.g., Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983 and Osborne and Pitchik, 
1986) the unique symmetric equilibrium for this game involves mixing over the range of prices 
{pmin,v} where 
pmin =  (v + c)/2 =$4.00.
20        ( 1 )  
For emphasis, we highlight the range v and pmin, as the vertical bar on the left side of Figure 1. In 








= , p ∈  [4,  6].       (2) 
Most of the pricing density for H(p) lies close to the lower bound of the mixing distribution.  For 
example, setting H(p) = .5, the median of the density distribution  = $4.43.   p ~
Consider now the effects on static predictions of a pair of consolidations that reduces the 
number of sellers from four to two.  The supply and demand arrays shown on the right side of 
Figure 1 illustrate.  Absent any synergies, the consolidations simply double the size of the 
merging firms.  The consolidations increase market power because each seller now sells 75% of 
his or her capacity with certainty (3 of 4 units available) rather than 50% (1 of 2 units).   
                                                 
19 To determine pbe , solve  ( ) ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( 2 3 = − − + − − F c p F c p be be , with c = $2 and F = $3. 
20 The constraints imposed by constant earnings and identical distributions make uniqueness in symmetric strategies 
obvious.  While we are unable to rule out the existence of asymmetric mixing equilibria for the four seller game, we 
would be surprised to learn that asymmetric equilibria existed.  Analyzing a two-seller pricing in a “box” design that 
closely parallels the market structure examined here, Cripps and Ireland (1988) establish uniqueness of the 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.  We expect that this such result extends to the case of four identical sellers.  
More generally, we observe (as did Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983 and Osborne and Pitchek, 1986) that security 
earnings in the symmetric mixing equilibrium are unique.  Thus, finite repetition of the game creates no additional 
subgame perfect equilibria, since no threat of earnings different from those expected in the symmetric mixing 
equilibrium exist.  Of course, as is well known, indefinite repetition creates additional equlibria.  Finally, we observe 
that our method of identifying the equilibrium for this 4-seller game follows that procedure set out by Holt and Solis 
Soberon (1992) for calculating equilibrium mixing distributions multi-seller games using the “step-function” 
demand and supply curves that are typical in laboratory posted-offer markets.  
  8Reasoning as in the four seller case, the consolidated sellers randomize over a range from v to 
ρmin where,  
ρ min = (3v + c)/4 = $5.00.        ( 3 )  
 











) (,   ρ ∈  [5,  6].       (4) 
(We use ρ to denote the post-merger price.)  Setting M(ρ) = .5 yields a median price ρ ~ = $5.43.  
  Experimental evidence suggests that in market games of this sort, sellers recognize and 
respond to conditions that create unilateral market power (see. e.g., Davis and Holt, 1994, and 
Wilson, 1998).  We are, however, aware of no experiments that examine the response of sellers 
to conditions that increase pre-existing market power.  This is a rather interesting question, as the 
predicted comparative static response requires sellers to alter their distribution of random 
responses.  This question forms our first conjecture.  
 
Conjecture 1: Absent strategic buyers, the increase in market power induced by consolidating 
sellers will increase prices significantly.  
 
3.2 Synergies and Merger-Induced Market Power.  Consider now the same pair of 
consolidations, but suppose that as a consequence of the mergers, the consolidating firms enjoy a 
large merger-induced synergy that reduces fixed costs.  Specifically, assume that that fixed costs 
for each pair of consolidating firms falls by $4.50, from a (combined) $6 pre-merger to $1.50.   
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates.  Notice that due to the reduction in fixed costs, average cost 
curves for each of the two sellers fall from ac to ac'. (We will use the apostrophe to denote 
variables involving a fixed cost efficiency post-merger.)  Relatedly, the breakeven price falls 
from pbe = $3.71 to  be ' ρ  = $2.43.  Nevertheless, the equilibrium mixing distribution remains 
unaffected (Note in equations (2) and (4) that fixed costs play no role in the sellers’ mixing 
distributions).  This observation underpins the reticence of antitrust authorities to consider fixed 
cost synergies, because such savings do not affect equilibrium pricing behavior. 
Alternatively, suppose that the merging firms enjoy unit cost synergies of a total 
magnitude comparable to the fixed cost reduction just considered.  The supply and demand 
arrays shown in the right panel of Figure 2 illustrate.  In the figure unit costs fall from c = $2 pre-
  9merger to cu = $0.71 post-merger.
21  As with the fixed cost reduction, the unit cost savings shift 
downward both the average cost curves and the breakeven price.  However, unlike fixed cost 
savings, a comparable unit cost efficiency reduces the median of the mixing distribution from 
ρ ~= $5.43 to  u ρ ~ = $5.24.
22  
Analytically the equilibrium mixing distribution for the static post-merger game, shown 
in equation (4), makes clear the effect of unit cost synergies on prices.  Unit costs c are a 
negative term both in the numerator and denominator of (4).  Thus, reductions in c increase the 
cumulative density at any price ρ < v.  We summarize the differing effects of fixed cost and unit 
cost synergies on static equilibrium predictions as a second conjecture. 
 
Conjecture 2: Absent strategic buyers, a unit cost synergy reduces post-merger prices. However 
a fixed cost synergy of comparable magnitude does not affect post-merger prices.  
 
Prior to considering the possible effects of countervailing buyer power, we observe that 
the predicted effects of unit cost savings here are relatively small.  Despite a $1.29 per unit cost 
savings, the median of the equilibrium mixing distribution falls only $.19 (from $5.43 to $5.24), 
far less than the $1.00 increase in the median of the equilibrium mixing distribution generated by 
reducing the number of sellers from four to two.  
In Davis and Wilson (2000, 2006) we identify some conditions where sellers follow 
underlying static Nash equilibrium predictions in responding to unit cost synergies.  Davis and 
Wilson (2000) reports an asymmetric three seller design, where  a unit cost synergy changes the 
large seller’s unique static equilibrium strategy from one characterized by randomization over a 
range of supra-competitive prices, to a pure strategy posting at the competitive price.  Davis and 
Wilson (2006) examines the effects of unit cost synergies in a continuous-unit differentiated 
product Bertrand game, where all reference equilibrium predictions are in pure rather than mixed 
strategies, and where the associated merger reduces number of sellers from four to three.   The 
effect investigated here is considerably more sutble. 
Design constraints drive the comparatively subtle predicted unit cost synergy effect.   
(Indeed, reducing unit costs to zero, reduces the median of the mixing distribution only to $5.14.)  
                                                 
21 The savings of $1.29 per unit generates a total expected savings of $4.50.  Each seller sells 3.5 units each period 
in expectation.   3.5 × ($2 – $0.71) = $4.50. 
22 To generate the lower bound of the mixing distribution, insert cu= $0.71 into (3) to generate 
u min ρ = $4.67.  u ρ ~  is 
derived from (4) by setting M(ρ) =.5 when c = cu.  
  10Enhancing the predicted responses of sellers to unit cost synergies requires the use of more 
complicated demand and/or unit cost conditions, where an increased number of units trade each 
period.  These conditions undermine both the transparency and the potential scope of price 
effects in the powerful buyer markets described in the next subsection.   Further, increasing the 
number of units traded per period would increase period length, and thus would reduce the 
number of trading periods that could be conducted per session.  In any case, a failure to observe 
predicted responses to unit cost synergies, does not necessarily imply confusion on the part of the 
randomizing sellers.  Other effects, particularly tacit collusion among the post-merger duopolists, 
may dominate the relatively small predicted unit cost synergy effects.  
 
3.3. Buyer Withholding, Market Power and Synergies.  Rational buyer withholding 
requires indefinite repetition of the above game.  Buyers must balance the costs of failing to 
make profitable purchases in a current period against the expected gain of inducing lower prices 
in future periods.  Suppose we consolidate the buyer side of the market shown in Figures 1 and 2 
into of a pair of buyers, B1 and B2, each of whom is “powerful” in the sense that they control at 
least three units (e.g., give B1 3 units one period, and 4 units the next).  Thus, in any period, via 
withholding, each buyer can unilaterally preclude half the sellers from completing a transaction, 
both pre-merger (where the highest pricing 2 of the 4 sellers will sell no units) and post-merger 
(where the highest pricing of the 2 sellers will trade no units).  Assume that the sellers know that 
the buyer side of the market consists of two powerful buyers, and that all agents know, as public 
information, each seller’s unit and fixed costs, and each buyer’s values.
23  The structure of 
moves is the same as before, except that the buying sequence consists of shopping decisions by 
two buyers, rather than one, and each buyer may elect to forego profitable purchases in a period 
in an effort to elicit lower prices in subsequent periods.  Specifically, each period sellers S1 to S4 
simultaneously post prices, which are displayed as public information.  Then one of the buyers, 
B1 or B2 is randomly selected to “shop.”  The selected buyer may purchase up to their capacity 
each period, as long as prices are less than or equal to their common unit value, v.  When the first 
                                                 
23 Any equilibrium analysis of this game would require specification of a discount factor or a probability of 
termination.  We omit this from the present characterization because we do not attempt to solve for an equilibrium, 
and because we induced no specific probability of continuation in our experiment. 
  11buyer finishes, the remaining buyer makes purchase decisions.
24  Sellers observe how many units 
they sold in a period.  However, sellers observe neither the total number of units sold, nor which 
buyer made purchases from them.  As mentioned in the introduction, analyzing the equilibrium 
for such a game is a formidable undertaking that extends well beyond the scope of this paper.  As 
an alternative we offer the following three informal conjectures regarding the addition of 
strategic buyers in this market game.   
 
Conjecture 3:  Inserting powerful human buyers into the above environments reduces prices, 
both pre-merger and post-merger.  
 




Conjecture 5: Given powerful human buyers, a unit cost synergy reduces post-merger prices. 
However a fixed cost synergy of comparable magnitude does not affect post-merger prices.  
 
Conjectures 3 is motivated by the possibility that demand-side withholding creates in 
buyers a bargaining power not available with simulated buyer decisions.  At some level, it would 
be surprising if the introduction of this potentially powerful action did not result in reduced seller 
prices.  Conjecture 4 addresses the amount of withholding we might expect to observe in the 
repeated game.  Although we have not attempted to characterize the equilibrium set for this 
repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth game with real buyers, we would expect that the equilibrium set 
includes “efficient” elements, where withholding does not occur:  Sellers, recognizing the 
credibility of buyers’ threats, should eventually reduce prices sufficiently to avoid “punishment.”  
Thus, as a reference prediction, we evaluate behavior relative to these efficient outcomes. 
We emphasize that Conjecture 4 is a reference prediction.  As mentioned above in section 
2, previous experimental evidence with powerful buyers (responders) reported by Engle-Warnik 
and Ruffle (2002), Ruffle (2000) and Slembeck (1999) suggest that withholding may cause 
                                                 
24 The purchase decisions of one buyer are not directly revealed to the other.  Buyers can, however infer each other’s 
purchase decisions with reasonable accuracy from seller “out of stock” messages.  In the event of withholding, 
however, sellers, have no way of discerning whether a lack of sales was due to withholding by B1, B2 or by a 
combination of both B1 and B2. 
25 In market experiments, the term “efficiency” typically refers to the percentage of the available buyer and seller 
surplus extracted by trade in a period.  To avoid confusing this term with the efficiencies that can mitigate antitrust 
concerns about mergers, in what follows we use the term “trading efficiencies” to refer to surplus extraction rates, 
and “synergies ” to refer to efficiencies associated with a consolidation. 
  12persistent trading efficiency losses in some markets.  Sessions in our experiment, however, are of 
considerably longer duration than those in the just-mentioned experiments.
26   
Conjecture 5 simply restates conjecture 2 for the case of real buyers.  The capacity of 
powerful buyers to extract both fixed and unit cost synergies is a primary motivation for our 
investigation. 
Prior to proceeding, we observe that the possibility of buyer withholding does not 
obviously tilt equilibrium outcomes in the favor of buyers.  For example, adapting the analysis 
by Groh (2004) to the present context might suggest that countervailing power does not affect 
the equilibrium at all.  In Groh’s analysis the credibility of buyer withholding depends on the 
buyer’s outside options, as well as on assumptions regarding information conditions.  In 
particular, withholding is credible (and thus elicits lower equilibrium prices) when the buyer has 
high switching costs and when sellers know a buyer’s trading history.  These features are absent 
from our markets, and their absence may undermine the credibility of a withholding strategy.  As 
discussed in section 2, Groh’s analysis fits only imperfectly into the current market structure.  
Our markets are not repeated infinitely and we introduce no explicit discount rate.  Even more 
importantly, exchange in our markets is multilateral rather than bilateral.  Sellers post prices to 
all buyers each period, and buyers can make purchases from different sellers.  Thus, the 
considerations regarding switching costs that underlie Groh’s analysis do not directly apply here.  
Nevertheless, we emphasize that as a theoretical matter, withholding strategies do not obviously 
allow buyers to elicit lower prices.  
 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures. 
To gain some insight into the relationship between powerful buyers, synergies and post-
merger prices, we conduct an experiment based on the market design developed in the preceding 
section.  Prior to reviewing the structure of the experiment we offer two comments about the 
incentive structure induced by these designs.  First, while costs and values in natural contexts are 
undoubtedly more complex than the supply and demand structures illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, 
the simplicity of our design facilitates laboratory investigation.  A simple design both increases 
the transparency of the relevant incentives and facilitates our communicating the market 
                                                 
26 Sessions in Tillman (1999) and Ruffle (2000) consisted of 20 periods.  Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2001) used 30 
period markets.  As explained below, our experiment consists of 50-period markets. 
  13structure to participants.  Using starkly simple cost and value structures helps assure that telling 
buyers and sellers the underlying cost and value structure actually creates common knowledge 
about supply and demand conditions.   
Second, we purposely make the effects of small amounts of withholding quite large.  A 
long history of experimental research suggests that the one-sided nature of the posted-offer 
trading institution confers an immense advantage on sellers, the posting side of the market.   
Thus, we felt compelled to make considerable effort to give buyers good chance of affecting 
performance via withholding.
27  We did not consider seriously the possibility that human buyers 
could drive prices to unit costs.  As we report below, buyer efforts to reduce prices were 
sometimes surprisingly effective. 
 
4.1 Experimental Design. The experiment consists of a series of 40 fifty-period posted-offer 
quadropolies.  In thirty of the sessions, a pair of symmetric consolidations occurs halfway 
through each market, generating two large symmetric sellers post-merger. The remaining 10 
sessions are control markets, where four sellers trade under constant conditions throughout the 
session.  By and large, markets followed standard laboratory posted-offer procedures.  Each 
period negotiations follow the standard sequence, with sellers first simultaneously posting price 
and maximum offer quantity decisions.  Production is to order in the sense that sellers bear unit 
costs only for those units that subsequently sell.
28  Seller posting decisions are followed by a 
shopping sequence, where buyers (simulated or real) make purchase decisions.  Each period, 
once seller decisions are complete, the price choice of each seller (but not that sellers’ maximum 
offer quantity) is made public to both buyers and to the other sellers.  During the purchasing 
sequence, the seller observes as private information his or her sales as they occur. (The seller, 
however, does not observe the identity of the purchasing buyer.)  As they make purchases, 
buyers observe the earnings consequences of each unit they purchase, as well as the sellers who 
still have stock remaining.  Upon the completion of the shopping sequence, we re-endow 
participants with unit values and costs, and a subsequent period begins.  
                                                 
27 Evidence from a variety of experimental studies where “real” buyers were used indicates that buyers in posted 
offer institutions tend to follow such “fully-revealing” rules almost uniformly (e.g., Davis and Williams, 1991, 
Ketcham, Smith and Williams, 1984, and Smith, 1981).  Even in the full information experiments reported by Ruffle 
(2000) and Engle-Warnik and Ruffle (2003) prices fell only occasionally, despite considerable withholding. 
28  Advance production would change importantly the analysis.  For an analysis of the effects of advance production 
in a Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game, see e.g. Tasnadi (2004).  
  14Market procedures deviate from standard posted-offer implementations in three respects. 
First, each seller bears a fixed cost each period.  This cost is borne regardless of whether or not 
any units the seller offers subsequently sell.  Second, to bound the sellers’ exposure to fixed 
costs, we barred them from posting prices that would necessarily generate negative profits for the 
period.
29  Third, buyers and sellers were told as common knowledge unit values, unit costs and 
fixed costs.   
Our treatments include the use of real or simulated buyers, the presence or absence of a 
consolidation, and the type of synergy induced.  In twenty of the forty markets, we automated 
buying decisions. In these “simulated buyer” markets a single automated buyer purchases seven 
of the eight units offered, provided prices on each unit are $6 or less.  Each period, the simulated 
buyer purchases the least expensive units first, followed by progressively more expensive units.  
In 20 remaining “human buyer” markets, we endow two buyers with a total of seven units each 
period.  We divide units evenly between buyers each period with the odd unit rotating between 
buyers across periods.  On each unit purchased, human buyers earn the difference between their 
unit value of $6 and the posted price.  Unlike simulated buyers, the human buyers had no 
obligation to fully reveal demand, and could (and often did) forego purchases in a period.
30   
The presence or absence of a consolidation represents a second treatment dimension.  In 
ten “control” markets the four sellers who make decisions for the first 25 periods continued, 
uninterrupted for an additional 25 periods.
31  In 30 remaining sessions a monitor interrupts the 
session after period 25 and announces that consolidations have occurred.  The sellers then each 
draw one of four cards labeled “A1”, “A2”, “M1” and “M2”.  Sellers A1 and A2 become 
“acquired sellers” while sellers M1 and M2 each become “merged firms.”  In these markets, 
sellers M1 and M2 each make price and quantity decisions for one of the two firms illustrated in 
the right panel of Figure 1, or in one of the panels of Figure 2.  Acquired sellers A1 and A2 
                                                 
29 The lower price bound is slightly below breakeven price pbe, since at best only seven of the eight units offered 
each period will sell.  Pre-merger, the minimum allowed price was $3.51.  Absent a synergy, the minimum price 
remained unchanged post-merger. With either a unit-cost or a fixed cost synergy, the minimum permissible post-
merger price fell to $2.38 per unit. 
30 Using two buyers rather than a single buyer allows us to conduct market sessions that do not turn entirely on the 
decisions of a single individual (the buyer). Dividing units among two buyers weakens somewhat each buyer’s 
bargaining position, relative to the case of a single buyer.  Nevertheless, buyers remain quite powerful, as either can 
unilaterally eliminate at least one seller from the market in any period, both pre-merger and post-merger.   
31 To improve comparability with procedures in the consolidation treatments, the control markets were paused 
briefly after period 25. A monitor announced that the market would continue, exactly as before for an indefinite 
number of additional periods (which might or might not be followed by still other additional sequences).  
  15watch (but do not communicate with) M1 and M2, respectively, under the condition that M1 and 
M2 divide post-merger earnings equally with their acquired counterparts.
32  The markets 
continue for another 25 periods.  Both the consolidation and the end of the experiment occur 
without prior announcement. (In fact, post-merger participants were told not only that the final 
period of the second sequence would not be announced in advance, but also that the market 
might or might not contain yet other sequences.) 
For the 30 “consolidation” sessions, synergies represent the third treatment dimension.  In 
ten “no-synergy” markets, each seller’s capacity doubles with the consolidation from two units to 
four, and fixed costs increase from $3 to $6 per period, as illustrated by the cost arrays in the 
right panel of Figure 2.  In a second set of ten “fixed cost synergy” markets, fixed costs for the 
consolidated seller fall by $4.50 from $6 to $1.50 per period.  In ten remaining “unit cost 
synergy” markets, unit costs for the consolidated firm fall from $2.00 to $0.71 per unit, an 
amount that also generates expected savings of $4.50 per period.   
Table 1 summarizes the matrix of treatments.  Our options of two consolidation 
conditions (merger or no-merger), two buyer types, and three possible synergies create twelve 
possible treatment cells.  As Table 1 suggests we conduct five sessions in each treatment cell 
except for the four cells (uninteresting for the present purposes) where synergies occur absent a 
consolidation.  Table 1 also introduces the two-part identifier we will use to refer to the different 
treatments.  The first two letters “SB” or “RB” indicate the use of simulated or human buyers, 
respectively, while the final letters, “C”, “N”, “F” or “U” indicate, respectively, control, no 
synergy, a fixed cost synergy or a unit cost synergy.  Thus, for example, the identifier RBU in 
the lower right corner of the table refers to the five markets conducted with real buyers, where a 
unit cost synergy accompanied the consolidations.  
 
4.2. Experimental Procedures. At the outset of each session, a monitor randomly seats student 
volunteers at visually isolated personal computers.  The monitor then reads instructions aloud as 
participants follow along on a copy of their own. The instructions explain general market 
incentives, as well as the computerized posted-offer trading mechanism. After the monitor 
                                                 
32 The merged seller splits earnings with an acquired seller in order to reduce the chances that post-merger price 
reductions might be driven by sellers and/or buyers regarding the consolidation as a pure windfall for the merging 
seller. Our procedure follows closely that used by Huck et al. (2001), except that unlike Huck et al. we prohibit 
communications between the merged seller and their acquired counterpart.   
  16answers participants’ questions, the market commences.  Except for two sessions, data were 
collected in simultaneously-conducted multiple markets.  
Participants were students recruited from upper level undergraduate business and MBA 
classes at Virginia Commonwealth University in the spring semester of 2003 and in the summer 
term of 2004.  We converted salient earnings from Lab dollars to U.S. currency at a rate of $10 
Lab = $1 US.  In addition to their salient earnings, we paid participants a $6 appearance fee for 
meeting their appointment.
33  Also, sellers in the “human buyer” markets were given an ex post 
supplement of $4-$6.  As will be evident below, seller earnings were far lower than what we 
expected ex ante, and we provided the ex post supplements in order to keep low earnings from 
discouraging participation by others.
34  A total of 200 students participated in the 40 markets 
which each lasted between 60 and 95 minutes.  No one participated in more than one market.  
Earnings ranged from $9.00 to $55.50 and averaged about $22.00. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
The median price paths for the simulated buyer and real buyer treatments, shown 
respectively in the upper and lower panels of Figure 3, illustrate some of the primary 
experimental results.  Looking first at the upper panel, notice that in the simulated-buyer 
markets, mergers clearly raise prices.  Comparing the median price paths for the merger/no-
synergy (SBN) sessions with the no-merger control (SBC) treatments, observe in the SBN 
markets that, despite starting somewhat above the median of the pre-merger static Nash mixing 
distribution,  =$4.43, the price path clearly trends upward post-merger, toward the median of 
the post-consolidation mixing distribution, 
p ~
ρ ~=$5.43.  In contrast, the median price path in the 
SBC treatment hovers about the pre-merger static Nash prediction throughout the session.  As 
suggested by the proximity of the SBF and SBN price paths post-merger, merger-associated 
fixed cost synergies do not affect performance.  On the other hand, terminal prices for the SBU 
treatment suggest that unit cost synergies exert some power-mitigating effect.  Notice, also 
however, that pre-merger prices in the SBU treatment lie below those in either the SBN or SBF 
                                                 
33 In some instances more participants appeared that we could use in a session.  Extra participants were identified as 
“alternates.”  Alternates were paid $10 and were invited to come back in a subsequent session. 
34 Twenty-four of the 80 sellers in the real buyer sessions ended the session with negative salient earnings.  Even 
with the $6 appearance fee, 14 of these sellers would have earned less than $4.00 for 1 to 1 ½ hours of their time.  
  17treatments, suggesting that less aggressive (or less tacitly collusive) sellers in the SBU treatment 
may drive the lower post-merger prices.  
Median price paths for the real buyer sessions, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3 tell 
a very different story.  First, comparing across panels, observe that the presence of real buyers 
results in uniformly lower prices: Prices in the real buyer sessions either hover about the pre-
merger Nash prediction  =$4.43, or lie below it.  Further, the median price paths exhibit either 
no obvious trend or trend downward post merger (particularly in the RBU treatment).  The stable 
or downward-trending post-merger price paths in the RBN, RBF and RBU treatments suggests 
that real buyers fully offset market power, and in some instances may extract from sellers a 
portion of merger-associated synergies. 
p ~
In the remainder of this section we evaluate more formally the results suggested by 
Figure 3.  We proceed by evaluating in turn the five conjectures offered in the previous section.  
In the analysis that follows we focus on the median of posted prices for the final 10 periods of 
the initial (pre-consolidation) and terminal (post-consolidation) sequences.
35  To analyze results, 
we compare both pre-merger and post-merger “levels”, as well as the “differences,” or the 
change in levels within sessions.  These latter comparisons are often useful for identifying 
merger-associated treatment effects.  Research hypotheses for pre- and post-merger levels, as 
well as for differences follow naturally from the statement of each conjecture.  For clarity, we 
state the appropriate null hypothesis above each test result.  Finally, for purposes of 
completeness, we report results of both nonparametric Mann-Whitney (‘MW’) tests as well as 
Fisher Exact Probability (‘FEP’) tests for comparisons of medians.  The median prices upon 
which this analysis is based appear as tables A1 and A2 in the appendix.   
Consider first the effects of merger-induced market power increases on prices in the 
simulated buyer markets.  Table 2 summarizes the pertinent price information.  As stated in 
conjecture 1, in simulated buyer markets, prices should move directly with market power 
                                                 
35 Thus, single data points are the median of posted-prices for all sellers in a session in periods 16-25 and 41-50.  We 
concentrate our attention on decisions in the last 10 periods to allow for learning at the outset of sessions, as well as 
to control for “restart” effects of the type observed by Andreoni (1988).  We use median rather than mean prices as 
the unit of analysis, because the reference predictions in section 3 are developed in terms of median prices, and 
because the non-parametric tests we use to draw conclusions are tests of medians under more general circumstances 
than they are test of means. (Using a Mann-Whitney or a Fisher’s Exact Probability test to test for the equality of 
means requires the assumption that the distribution of observations is symmetric.  Symmetry is not required to use 
these tests to test for the equality of medians.)  However, our results are robust to the selection of final period 
segment, and to the use of means rather than medians as the basis of analysis. 
  18increases.  Pooling the SBN, SBF and SBU sessions into an ‘SBM’ cell identifying sessions 
where a merger occurs, observe that the pre-merger median price in the 15 SBM sessions, $4.95, 
does not differ significantly from the pre-merger median of $4.75 in the 5 simulated buyer 
control (‘SBC’) sessions (MW p=.36, FEP p=1.00).  Post-merger, however, this difference does 
become significant, as the median price in the SBM sessions rises to $5.53 and the median price 
for the SBC sessions falls to $4.59 (MW p=.01, FEP p=.02).  Similarly, notice in the rightmost 
column of Table 2 that the median post-merger price increase of $0.43 in the SBM sessions 
significantly exceeds the median $0.04 increase in the final ten periods of the SBC sessions (MW 
p=.02, FEP p=.02).  To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that increasing existing seller 
market power raises prices.  This is our first finding. 
Finding 1:  In simulated buyer markets, increasing market power via mergers raises 
prices.  
 
Consider next the effects of synergies on post-merger prices in the simulated buyer 
markets, the subject of conjecture 2.  Table 3 summarizes median pre- and post-merger prices for 
the three simulated buyer treatments where a merger occurred.  Notice in the upper row block of 
Table 3 that fixed costs synergies do nothing to reduce prices in the simulated buyer markets.  
The median pre-merger price of $5.50 for the five simulated buyer/no synergy (‘SBN’) markets 
does not differ significantly from the median of $5.35 for the five simulated buyer/ fixed cost 
synergy (‘SBF’) markets (MW p=.67, FEP p=1.00).  Post-merger, median prices in the SBF 
markets actually exceed those in the SBN markets ($5.83 vs. $5.53).  Mann Whitney test results 
suggest that this difference is significant, although results of the Fisher Exact Probability test do 
not also support such a conclusion (MW p=.10, FEP p=.53).  Overall, the median post-merger 
price increase of $0.27 for the SBF sessions does not differ significantly from the comparable 
median of $0.25 for the SBN sessions (MW p=.35, FEP p=1.00).  
On the basis of these results, we pool the SBN and SBF sessions, and compare median 
prices for a combined SBN/SBF (‘SBNF’) treatment with those for the SBU treatment 
(simulated buyers/unit cost synergies).  As suggested by the middle column in the lower row 
block of Table 3, the median post-merger price of $5.80 for the SBNF treatment significantly 
exceeds the mean post-merger price of $5.04 for the SBU treatment (MW p=.01, FEP p=.02), 
suggesting that the unit cost synergies induced here mitigate merger-induced market power 
changes, as predicted.  The pre-merger medians of $5.42 and $4.50 for the respective SBNF and 
  19SBU treatments, lead us to qualify this finding, as less aggressive sellers in the SBU sessions 
rather than synergies may also help explain lower median post-merger SBU prices.  That said, 
low pre-merger prices in the SBU sessions say nothing definitive about either the aggressiveness 
of post-merger duopolists, or the price-tempering effect of unit cost synergies.
36  To err on the 
side of caution, we draw here a qualified conclusion regarding the effect of unit cost synergies on 
post-merger pricing. 
 
Finding 2.  With simulated buyers, a large fixed cost synergy affects neither post-merger prices 
nor post-merger price increases.  In contrast, post-merger prices are lower in the SBU markets 
characterized by a unit cost synergy than in the combined SBN and SBF markets, suggesting that 
unit cost synergies reduce prices, as predicted. However, we also observe sellers in the SBU 
treatment were more competitive pre-merger than in the other SBN/SBF markets.  
 
  Given the subtlety of the predicted unit cost synergy effect, we were somewhat surprised 
to observe even qualified support for a unit cost synergy here.  Unlike the predicted increase in 
the mixing distribution induced by reducing the number of sellers from four to two, tacit 
collusion in the post-merger two seller markets merger would undermine the predicted effects of 
unit cost synergies.  
Next we shift attention to the effects of using real buyers.  First we evaluate the extent to 
which real buyers reduce prices, as articulated in Conjecture 3. Table 4 summarizes median price 
information for the 20 simulated buyer (‘SB’) sessions, and for the 20 real buyer (‘RB’) sessions.  
Reading across the columns observe that the pre-merger median price of $4.80 in the SB sessions 
significantly exceeds the pre-merger median of $4.00 in the RB sessions (MW p=.001, FEP 
p=.001).  Similarly the post-merger median price of $5.44 in the SB sessions significantly 
exceeds the post-merger median of $4.18 in the RB sessions (MW p=.001, FEP p=.001).  Notice 
finally in the right column of Table 4 that post-merger median price increase of $0.52 for the SB 
sessions significantly exceeds the $0.10 price reduction in the RB sessions (MW p=.01, FEP 
p=.06).  Combined, these results support Conjecture 3, which is our third finding. 
Finding 3:  Inserting human buyers into these posted-offer markets reduces pre-merger prices, 
post-merger prices, and the difference between pre- and post-merger prices within markets.   
 
                                                 
36 Indeed notice that the median increase for the SBU treatment of $0.52 actually exceeds the median increase of 
$0.26 for the SBNF treatments (albeit not significantly so), suggesting that the post-merger duopolists in the SBU 
sessions recognized and exploited their increased power.  
  20Consider next the extent to which real buyers reduce trading efficiency, the subject of 
Conjecture 4.  The histograms shown in the two panels of Figure 4 list mean initial- and 
terminal-segment efficiencies (white bars and grey bars, respectively) for the last 10 periods of 
each segment.  Comparing across the panels, notice that trading efficiencies are between 10% 
and 25% lower in the real buyer treatments than in each of the comparable simulated buyer 
treatments.  Thus, while the use of real buyers reduces prices substantially, the negotiation 
process is uniformly costly in terms of foregone trading efficiency.  Table 5 summarizes mean 
trading efficiencies aggregated across RB and SB treatments.  As is clear from the table, mean 
trading efficiencies for the RB sessions are between 15 and 18 percentage points lower in the RB 
sessions than in the SB sessions (85% vs. 100% in periods 16-25 and 82% vs. 100% in periods 
41-50), differences that are easily significant (in either segment comparison MW p=.001, FEP 
p=.001.)
37  This is our fourth finding:  
Finding 4: Powerful human buyers substantially reduce trading efficiency.  
 
The persistence of withholding-induced trading efficiency losses in our markets extends 
results of previously reported experiments of somewhat shorter duration by Slembeck (1999), 
Ruffle (2000) and Ruffle and Engle-Warnik (2003), and suggests an important potential cost of 
these thin, full information market structures.  Perhaps with time trading efficiency might 
increase as buyers come to credibly communicate their threats to withhold.  At the least, 
however, trading efficiency losses appear to be neither small nor trivially transitory.  To the 
contrary, as seen in the rightmost column of Table 5, mean trading efficiencies for the real buyer 
markets actually decreased by 4 percentage points in periods 41-50 relative to periods 16-25.  
Our final conjecture regards the extent to which synergies affect pricing outcomes in real 
buyer markets.  Table 6 presents pertinent information.  Comparing median prices in the five real 
buyer/no synergy (‘RBN’) sessions with median prices in the five real buyer/fixed cost synergy 
(‘RBF’) sessions suggests that the presence of a fixed cost synergy does not reduce prices.  In the 
RBN sessions, median prices fall from $3.99 pre-merger to $3.94 post merger.  In the RBF 
markets median prices actually increase slightly $4.00 to $4.17.  However, median prices do not 
differ significantly either pre-merger (MW p=0.86, FEP p=0.52) or post-merger (MW p=0.25, 
                                                 
37 Notice that Table 5 lists mean rather than median trading efficiencies.  The high frequency of periods where all 
possible gains from exchange were extracted makes mean trading efficiencies a more useful summary measure of 
trading efficiency outcomes. 
  21FEP p=1.00).  Similarly, median post-merger price differences of $0.00 for the RBN market and 
-$0.77 for RBF market do not differ significantly (MW p=0.33, FEP p=0.36).   
The bottom two row blocks of Table 6 evaluate alternative poolings of sessions that 
evaluate various possible synergy effects.  First, we pool the RBN/RBF sessions into a single 
(‘RBNF’) treatment and compare median prices with the 5 real buyer/unit cost (‘RBU’) sessions. 
This pooling allows us to evaluate the extent to which unit cost rather than fixed cost synergies 
affect post merger behavior.  As is clear from of the middle row block in Table 6, neither price 
levels, nor price level differences approach significance.  For example, as seen in the rightmost 
column of the table, the median post-merger price reduction of $0.19 in the RBNF treatment 
actually exceeds the $0.02 median price reduction in the RBU treatment, making it impossible to 
conclude that buyers extract unit cost synergies (MW p=.90, FEP p=.43)  
The bottom row block of Table 6 pools into a single treatment prices in the two synergy 
treatments RBF/RBU (‘RBUF’) and compares prices with those in the no-synergy RFN 
treatment.  This pooling allows evaluation of the (admittedly ad hoc) hypothesis that synergies 
induce increased aggression in buyers.  Were this true, post-merger prices in the combined 
RBF/RBU (‘RBUF’) sessions should fall below those in the RFN treatment.  Results of this 
comparison do not support such a “synergy” effect.  The median post-merger price of $3.94 in 
the RBN treatment exceeds the median post-merger price of $3.84 in the RBUF only marginally 
and insignificantly (MW p=0.39, FEP p=0.57).  Similarly, while the post-merger median price 
difference -$0.43 in the RBUF treatment exceeds the median difference of $0.00 in the RBN 
treatment, the treatment effect does not approach significance at conventionally accepted levels 
(MW p=0.27, FEP p=0.43). This is our fifth finding: 
Finding 5:  In the real buyer markets, neither fixed cost synergies nor unit cost synergies 
significantly affect median post-merger prices. 
 
This negative result regarding the effects of synergies on post-merger prices in real buyer 
markets on a treatment level belies the fact prices that in several of the real buyer markets, 
particularly those in the RBF and RBU treatments, prices did fall very considerably post-merger.  
For example, in 5 of the 10 RBF and RBU markets the median reduction in post-merger prices 
exceeded $0.75.  Thus, although buyers may not consistently extract merger-associated 
synergies, in many instances, they do.  Prior to concluding this section we offer some 
observations regarding the relationship between buyer actions and prices, as a means of gaining 
  22some insight into heterogeneity of outcomes across treatments.  Note first, that in several 
instances the buyer side of the market engaged in very substantial withholding.  Figure 5 
illustrates.  The three panels of the figure plot median posted prices for the last 10 periods of a 
segment (initial or terminal) against the percentage of units in the entire segment that buyers 
collectively elected to not purchase.  Notice that in several instances, buyers engaged in very 
considerable withholding.  For example, as shown in the top panel, in the initial segment of the 
20 real buyer markets, buyers withheld the purchase of at least 20% of the available units in 4 
markets.  Similarly, in the terminal segments, buyers withheld at least 20% of possible purchases 
in 2 of the 10 markets where no synergy occurred (shown in the middle panel) and in 4 of the 10 
synergy markets.  But buyer withholding was far from uniform across sessions.  Notice also in 
Figure 5 that buyers withheld 5% or fewer of the available purchases in 4 of the 20 initial 
segments, and in 3 of the 20 terminal segments.  
Second we observe that the consequences of demand withholding are far from uniform.  
Were it the case that establishing a reputation for withholding drives down prices, we should see 
a negative relationship between median prices for the final 10 periods of a segment, and total 
instances of withholding.  But, as is obvious from the three panels of the figure, no such 
relationship exists either in the initial or in the terminal segments.  Each of the panels illustrate 
instances where transactions prices remain relatively high despite very significant withholding 
(shown in the upper right quadrant of each panel), and instances where mean transactions prices 
were low, despite very limited withholding (shown in the lower left quadrant of each panel).  The 
extreme heterogeneity of outcomes echoes results observed by Slembeck (1999) in an ultimatum 
game context, namely that the personalities of the participants importantly affect outcomes such 
thin markets.  This is our final finding: 
Finding 6:  Outcomes are highly variable in the real buyer markets.  Buyers withhold demand 
heterogeneously, and further, sellers respond heterogeneously to buyer withholding.  
 
6. Conclusions. 
This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the interrelationships between 
powerful buyers, mergers, and merger-induced synergies in a repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth 
context.  Although human buyers appear to induce generally lower prices, we also find that the 
presence of human buyers generally undermines the comparative static predictions that follow 
from passive buyer models.  Further, trading in the human buyer markets tends to be 
  23characterized by very considerable outcome variability, and by an overall reduction in trading 
efficiency.  
Naturally occurring markets are, of course, considerably more complex than the very 
simple structures considered here.  Nevertheless, results of our experiments, we believe, 
tentatively offer two implications for antitrust policy.  First, given powerful buyers, the 
predictions in standard unilateral-effects policy models no longer provide a reasonable basis for 
evaluating the consequences of a merger.  Rather, policy variants of more sophisticated models, 
such as the model recently proposed by Inderst and Wey (2003) must be developed.  The policy 
recommendations generated by such models will necessarily be more nuanced than those arising 
from unilateral effects analysis, because a variety of features typically excluded in current 
unilateral effects analysis, such as the curvature of the market surplus function, and current and 
feasible production technologies become important.
38  We believe that this is an area where 
continued experimental research can play an important role, particularly given the subtlety of the 
pertinent theoretical predictions.  At present we are preparing an analysis that parallels the 
present study, but in a bargaining context that more closely matches the assumptions regarding 
institutional trading rules typically made by theorists in intermediate goods markets.  
Second, in addition to the added complexity of these new models, our laboratory results 
suggest that outcomes in markets with thin buyer and seller sides may be both difficult to predict 
and may be characterized by considerable bargaining inefficiencies.  Reducing a market to a 
small number of fully informed buyers and sellers changes the nature of interactions from 
decentralized market interactions to a relatively complex bargaining game.  Outcomes in such 
markets may be expected to be determined more by the personalities and bargaining strengths of 
the relevant buyers and sellers, than by predictable underlying structural characteristics.  Thus, 
while powerful buyers may ameliorate merger-induced market power increases, our results 
suggest that anticipating the effects of mergers in markets with real buyers may be even more 
difficult than in standard diffuse-buyer contexts.  
                                                 
38 As Inderst and Wey observe, in bilateral oligopolies, buyers may merge to influence sellers’ choice of technology.  
The possible links between consolidations and technology choice have been a matter of some concern to of U.S. 
antitrust authorities.  For a review see Gilbert and Sunshine (1995). 
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Notes   “MW” denotes a Mann Whitney Test,  and “FP” denotes a Fisher Exact Probability Test for the equality of medians.  
Tests are two-tailed when Ho is stated as an equality, and one-tailed otherwise. 
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Figure 1. Symmetric Pre- and Post-Merger Designs 
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Figure 2. Synergies and Post-Merger Predictions
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Figure 3.  Median Price Paths by Treatment Key: Each line denotes the path of median posted prices 
for the five markets in each treatment.  The upper panel illustrates price paths for the four simulated 
buyers (SB), while the lower panel illustrates price paths for the  four real buyer (RB) treatments.  In 
each panel the latter portion of the mnemonic, “C”, “N”, “F” or “U” denotes, respectively, control (no 
merger), no synergy, a fixed cost synergy or a unit cost synergy, respectively. 
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Figure 4.  Mean Trading Efficiencies by Treatment. Key: Each bar illustrates the mean trading 
efficiency for a treatment, over the last 10 periods of a segment  
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Figure 5.  Buyer Withholding and Median Prices.  Key: Each marker plots the median posted 
price for the final 10 periods of a market against the percentage of availabe units not purchased 
by buyers throughout the segment. 
 
        ‘ ’  indicates an RBC session (no merger, no synergy) 
        ‘’ indicates an RBN session (merger, no synergy) 
        ‘•’  indicates an RBF session (merger, fixed cost synergy) 
        ‘ο’  indicates an RBU session (merger, unit cost synergy) 
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Table A1 Simulated Buyer Treatments.  Median Posted Prices, Last 10 Periods Initial and 











(c) – (b) 
SBC1  5.20 5.24  0.04 
SBC2  4.85 4.52  -0.33 
SBC3  4.10 4.00  -0.10 
SBC4  4.75 4.85  0.10 
SBC5  4.43 4.59  0.16 
        
SBN1  5.70 5.45  -0.25 
SBN2  5.01 5.80  0.79 
SBN3  5.50 5.53  0.03 
SBN4  4.60 5.03  0.43 
SBN5  5.60 5.85  0.25 
        
SBF1  5.33 5.60  0.27 
SBF2  4.22 5.83  1.61 
SBF3  4.19 5.99  1.80 
SBF4  5.75 5.89  0.14 
SBF5  5.60 5.80  0.20 
        
SBU1  4.95 5.47  0.52 
SBU2  4.55 5.00  0.45 
4.40 5.04  SBU3  0.64 
SBU4  4.50 3.37  -1.13 
SBU5  4.25 5.43  1.18 
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Table A2 Real Buyer Treatments.  Median Posted Prices, Last 10 Periods Initial and 










Change  (Periods 16-25) 
RBC1  4.01 4.22  0.21 
RBC2  3.95 3.78  -0.17 
RBC3  4.77 4.65  -0.12 
RBC4  4.58 4.80  0.22 
RBC5  4.56 4.46  -0.10 
        
RBN1  4.20 5.04  0.84 
RBN2  3.89 3.60  -0.29 
RBN3  3.94 3.94  0.00 
RBN4  3.99 4.20  0.21 
RBN5  4.00 3.54  -0.46 
        
RBF1  5.39 4.17  -1.22 
RBF2  4.54 4.45  -0.09 
RBF3  4.00 4.50  0.50 
RBF4  3.58 2.81  -0.77 
RBF5  3.51 2.38  -1.13 
        
RBU1  3.57 2.45  -1.12 
RBU2  3.73 4.18  0.45 
3.99 2.46  RBU3  -1.53 
3.52 3.50  RBU4  -0.02 
4.24 4.57  RBU5  0.33 
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